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当前位置: 首页 > 文章 > 信息不对称、养殖户重大动物疫病防控与政策激励——基于委托代理理论视角 农业技术经济 2019 (1) 54-68
Position: Home > Articles > Information Asymmetry,Prevention and Control of Major Animal Epidemics of Farmers and Policy Incentives——Based on the Principal-agent Theory Journal of Agrotechnical Economics 2019 (1) 54-68

信息不对称、养殖户重大动物疫病防控与政策激励——基于委托代理理论视角

作  者：
田璞玉;郑晶;孙红
单  位：
华南农业大学经济管理学院
关键词：
信息不对称;重大动物疫病;生物保护;激励政策;委托代理理论
摘  要：
养殖户预防要素投入不足和隐瞒疫情可能导致动物疫病爆发和蔓延,造成巨大损失。通过构建养殖户重大疫病防控决策树,说明了养殖户违规行为产生的原因。进一步在委托代理理论框架下讨论了疫情披露和预防要素投入的激励相容条件,认为补偿除弥补扑杀损失功能外,也应通过激励养殖户预防要素投入而成为公共风险管理的工具,并通过案例验证了理论模型。以理论分析为依据,认为当前我国重大动物疫病防控政策存在重监管、轻激励、补偿程度低和补偿机制失当等问题,并可有以下改进:第一,增加扑杀补偿程度和违规惩罚程度可以激励养殖户披露疫情,其中,增加惩罚是更加节约成本的方式;第二,在补偿机制的设计中加入信号显示变量,实现养殖户投入社会最优防疫要素水平的激励相容条件。其中,信号显示机制可以包含并综合考虑这三种机制:按规模差别化补偿;染病率与补偿呈反比的机制(如只对存活的禽畜进行补偿);相对染病率比较的补偿机制,即补偿不仅依赖该养殖户染病情况,还部分依赖与同区域内同类型养殖户的染病情况。
译  名：
Information Asymmetry,Prevention and Control of Major Animal Epidemics of Farmers and Policy Incentives——Based on the Principal-agent Theory
作  者：
TIAN Puyu;ZHENG Jing;SUN Hong;
单  位：
TIAN Puyu%ZHENG Jing%SUN Hong
关键词：
Information asymmetry;;Major animal epidemic;;Biological protection;;Incentive policies;;Principal-agent theory
摘  要：
Inadequate investment in animal disease prevention factors and hiding epidemic information may lead to the outbreak and spread of animal epidemics,and then resulting in huge economic losses. This article builds a farmer prevention and control of major disease prevention decision tree,under the conditions of information asymmetry,it explains the reasons why farmers breed irregularities. Furthermore,under the framework of principal-agent theory,the conditions of incentive compatibility of epidemic situation disclosure and prevention factor input were discussed. This paper argues that compensation is not only to make up for the loss of culling,but also should become a tool of public risk management by encouraging farmers to invest in prevention factors,and verified the theoretical model through a case. Based on the theoretical analysis,it is considered that the current prevention and control policies on major animal epidemics in our country are subject to the following problems: emphasis on regulation but contempt incentives,low level of compensation and compensation mechanism failure,and the following improvements can be made: First,increasing the extent of culling compensation and penalties for violations can encourage farmers to disclose the outbreak,among them,increasing the degree of punishment is a more cost-saving way; Second,by adding the signal display variables into the design of the compensation mechanism,the incentives and compatibility conditions for the farmers to invest the optimal social epidemic prevention factors can be realized. Among them,the signal display mechanism can include and consider these three mechanisms: Different compensation for different scales; The infection rate is inversely proportional to the compensation( for example,only compensation for the live poultry); The compensation for the relative morbidity rate,that is,the compensation depends not only on the status of the affected farmer,but also partly on the condition of the same type of farmer in the same area.

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