Position: Home > Articles > Evolutionary Game of Chinese Herbal Medicine Supply Chain: Taking Farmers’ Quality Cheating Behavior into Account
Journal of Hebei Agricultural University Social Sciences
2023
(1)
9-20
考虑农户质量作弊行为的中药材供应链演化博弈
作 者：
胡海菊;祝卫鹏;李亚坤
单 位：
燕山大学经济管理学院
关键词：
中药材供应链;中药材质量;质量作弊;演化博弈;仿真分析
摘 要：
药品安全关乎公众生命健康、社会稳定。掺杂掺假、染色增重等质量作弊行为是导致中药材质量问题的主要原因。为给有效控制中药材农户的质量作弊行为提供管理参考依据，利用演化博弈分析和仿真实验的研究方法，在考虑中药企业对中药材农户群体的抽查比例、对不合格药材的农户的奖惩和政府对生产不合格药品企业的惩罚力度3个参数的条件下，建立由药农和中药企业组成的演化博弈模型，求解得到不同情形下的演化稳定状态，并且通过仿真实验分析上述3个参数对演化路径的影响。结果表明：(1)最优策略为中药材农户提供合格药材，中药企业采取抽查策略；(2)质量检测抽查比例对演化结果影响较大，当演化结果处于最优状态时，中药企业适当降低抽查比例可以降低质量检测成本，非最优状态下降低抽查比例会使演化结果恶化；(3)中药企业提高对提供不合格药材农户的奖惩力度、政府部门提高对中药企业的惩罚可以改善中药材质量。此外，政府增大惩罚力度，会使短时间内的选择严格质量检测的中药企业数量增多，但随着时间的推移这种作用会逐渐减弱。研究结果将为政府和中药企业有效治理中药材农户的质量作弊行为提供理论和实践指导。
译 名：
Evolutionary Game of Chinese Herbal Medicine Supply Chain: Taking Farmers’ Quality Cheating Behavior into Account
作 者：
HU Haiju;ZHU Weipeng;LI Yakun;School of Economics and Management, Yanshan University;
关键词：
traditional Chinese herbal medicine supply chain;;quality of traditional Chinese herbal medicines;;quality cheating;;evolutionary game;;simulation analysis
摘 要：
The safety of medicines is related to the health of people and social stability. However, traditional Chinese medicine industry is increasingly challenged by quality cheating behavior of the Chinese herbal medicine growers. It has been the most significant inhibitors of traditional Chinese medicine quality improvement. To effectively control the quality cheating behavior of growers, an evolutionary game model consisting of Chinese herbal medicine growers and Chinese medicine manufacturers was established. Two important parameters were incorporated into the model: the sampling ratio of medicine manufacturers and the government's penalties for manufacturers that produce unqualified medicines. The evolutionary stable state in different situations was obtained, and the influence of different parameters on the evolution path was analyzed by simulation. The results showed that: the optimal strategy is that Chinese herbal medicine growers provide qualified herbal medicine and Chinese medicine manufacturers conduct inspection randomly, in which case the manufacturers can control the cost of inspection by appropriately reducing sampling ratio. In addition, government should increase the sampling ratio and gives reward or punishment to cheating growers, which are effective measures to improve quality of Chinese herbal medicines.
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