关键词：
股权质押;控股股东;内部控制质量;非效率投资;企业
摘 要：
基于2007—2019年中国A股上市公司年度观测数据,可以实证检验控股股东股权质押对企业非效率投资的影响及其作用机制,研究发现:控股股东股权质押增加了企业非效率投资。运用面板门槛效应模型可以发现,控股股东持股比例对股权质押与企业非效率投资的关系存在显著的非线性双重门槛效应,即随着控股股东持股比例的提高,股权质押与企业非效率投资关系得到了先增强后减弱再增强的抑制效应;内部控制质量的影响表现为单门槛效应,即企业内部控制质量负向调节了股权质押与企业非效率投资的关系。
译 名：
On Control Shareholders' Equity Pledge and Enterprises' Inefficient Investment
作 者：
Jiang Shuai;Long Jing;School of Business, Nanjing University;
关键词：
equity pledge;;controlling shareholder;;internal control quality;;inefficient investment;;enter prises
摘 要：
This study investigates the impact of the controlling shareholders' equity pledge on enterprises' inefficient investment, using the annual observation data of China's A-Share listed companies from 2007 to 2019. We find that: the controlling shareholders' equity pledge will increase the firms' inefficient investment; there is a significant non-linear double threshold effect of the controlling shareholders' shareholding ratio on equity pledge and the enterprises' inefficient investment. We use the Panel Threshold Regression Model to analyze the threshold effect and find that with the increasing of the shareholding ratio of controlling shareholders, the relationship between equity pledge and inefficiency investment will be strengthened first, then weakened and finally enhanced; enterprises' internal control quality play a positive regulation role on the relationship between the controlling shareholders' equity pledge and the enterprises' inefficient investment. This study reveals the economic consequences of the controlling shareholders' equity pledge on the enterprises' investment efficiency and enriches the research on equity pledge and enterprise investment efficiency.
