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Position: Home > Articles > Dilemma of “Adverse Selection”And Financial Subsidy Incentive Mechanism Design of New Rural Social Pension Insurance Issues in Agricultural Economy 2013 (09) 77-84，111

“逆向选择”困局与“新农保”财政补贴激励机制设计

作  者：
赵建国;海龙
单  位：
东北财经大学公共管理学院
关键词：
新型农村社会养老保险;逆向选择;激励机制;缴费档次;财政补贴
摘  要：
在自愿选择档次缴费的原则下农民普遍选择最低缴费档次参保致使"新农保"制度遭受逆向选择问题的困扰。针对影响农民缴费档次选择的农民参保支付能力和财政补贴激励机制两个主要因素,本文从省域和不同收入组两个维度考察发现诱发逆向选择行为的关键因素并非农民参保支付能力。在构建项目投资收益模型的基础上,本文着重分析"一刀切"和"差异化"两类财政补贴激励机制对各缴费档次收益率的影响显示二者均产生了负向激励效应,表明现行财政补贴激励机制诱发并加剧了逆向选择问题。消解逆向选择是一个渐进的过程,短期内应设置合理的财政补贴激励机制,变定额补贴制为比率补贴制;中长期要持续实现农民增收,并适时采取"强制参保"的原则。
译  名：
Dilemma of “Adverse Selection”And Financial Subsidy Incentive Mechanism Design of New Rural Social Pension Insurance
作  者：
ZHAO Jianguo;HAI Long;
摘  要：
In the principle of farmer,selecting contribution levels on his own,Farmer generally choose the lowest contribution level,resulting in new rural social pension insurance having been plagued by the problem of adverse selection. Combined with the farmer's capacity of payment and financial subsidy incentive mechanism design of new rural social pension insurance which are two main factors affecting farmer selecting contribution levels,the paper found that farmer's capacity of payment was not the key factor which induced adverse selection,examine the current farmer's capacity of payment from the provincial and different income groups. Building the protects investment income model,the paper analyzed"One size fits all"model and"Differentiated"model of financial subsidy incentive mechanism design of new rural social pension insurance,the results showed that the two models both produced negative incentive effects,which indicated that the current financial subsidy incentive mechanism induced and exacerbated the problem of adverse selection. Resolving adverse selection is a gradual process. The paper suggests that setting a reasonable financial subsidy incentive mechanism design and changing the fixed subsidy system into the variable rate subsidy system in short term. In medium-and long-term,increasing farmer income constantly and taking the principle of "mandatory insurance"timely and prudently.

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